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As the U.S. economy started its downward slide in the summer of 2007, 
the rest of the world showed few signs of distress. Other countries’ seeming im-
munity to U.S. troubles evoked the theory of decoupling. It holds that many 
nations now depend less on the U.S. for growth, insulating them to some extent 
from our business cycles. 
A year later, the theory has lost some of its punch. Most economies now 
face threats to growth, leaving little doubt that the U.S. slowdown has spread to 
the rest of the world. A number of countries are suffering from decreasing U.S. 
consumer demand, and the U.S. mortgage sector’s credit problems have spilled 
across borders, ensnaring financial institutions worldwide.
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Today’s desynchronization may 
signal that the nature of U.S. influence 
over other economies is changing, 
notably in terms of timing. In the past, 
when the U.S. sneezed, the rest of the 
world caught a cold almost immedi-
ately. This time, it took months for the 
U.S. sneeze to produce symptoms in 
other countries. 
The timing change may be the 
product of globalization. The past few 
decades have brought reductions in 
trade barriers, increases in capital flows 
and surges in labor migration. In addi-
tion, financial deregulation, financial 
innovation and changes in the conduct 
of monetary policy have gradually 
multiplied many countries’ economic 
ties to the rest of the world. 
A more integrated world economy 
decreases other nations’ direct or 
immediate—but not necessarily their 
longer term—dependence on the U.S. 
Increasingly complex linkages may 
have, in fact, made countries respond 
to U.S. fluctuations with longer delays. 
Take China. The country has 
gradually increased exports to the 
European Union at the expense of 
sales to the U.S. However, China may 
not necessarily be less vulnerable to 
U.S. fluctuations because it might still 
be indirectly influenced by how U.S. 
trends affect the EU. These indirect 
effects, of course, would take longer to 
show up. The same pattern could hold 
for other countries that have diversified 
their trade ties (Chart 1).
Trade is only one factor in over-
all economic fluctuations. We use 
a broader perspective to determine 
whether U.S. influence now takes longer 
to manifest itself. Looking at nearly 
five decades of business-cycle patterns, 
we find a gradual decrease in how 
well current U.S. fluctuations explain 
changes in other countries’ current 
economic activity. We also find that 
U.S. cyclical movements since the early 
1980s have affected other economies 
with a lag, rather than contemporane-
ously, suggesting it now takes longer 
for U.S. trends to spread around the 
world.
At the same time, U.S. shocks’ 
cumulative effects have tended to 
increase over time and take longer to 
dissipate. This suggests U.S. economic 
Looking at nearly five   
decades of business-cycle   
patterns, we find a gradual 
decrease in how well current 
U.S. fluctuations explain 
changes in other countries’ 
current economic activity.
Chart 1
Key Exporting Countries Depend Less on U.S.
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that the U.S. still exerts significant 
influence over most EU members, 
especially the U.K. 
U.S. influence also ebbs for a 
group of non-EU countries—Canada, 
Japan, India and Korea (Chart 2B). 
Canada remains a top U.S. trading 
partner, but its economic synchroniza-
tion with its southern neighbor has 
eroded slightly. In this group, the cor-
relations show bigger declines after 
the 1981–2001 window, especially for 
influence may not be decreasing in the 
long run. Instead, the delay between 
U.S. fluctuations and their full manifes-
tations abroad seems to be increasing.
Current and Past Cycles 
Business cycles are temporary 
deviations from an economy’s long-
term growth path. We track these 
short-term fluctuations for the U.S. and 
11 other countries, using quarterly data 
from the beginning of 1960 to the end 
of 2007.1
To measure output, we use real 
gross domestic product for the U.S., 
Canada, Japan and the U.K. Industrial 
production indexes provide the long 
data series for Belgium, Denmark, 
France, India, Italy, Korea, the 
Netherlands and Spain. Data limitations 
preclude tracking two major trading 
partners, China and Mexico.2 
In studying business cycles, we 
believe it’s important to use real-time 
data because firms and individuals 
base decisions about inward capital 
flows and investments on the growth 
expectations, recession announcements 
and other factors available at the time. 
Both private and federal agencies—
for example, the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, the entity that 
dates U.S. recessions—operate with 
real-time data only.3
How well do current U.S. cyclical 
movements explain other countries’ 
current economic fluctuations? We 
conduct simple pairwise correlations 
of real-time business cycles, mak-
ing estimates for moving windows of 
80 quarters, or 20 years.4 This tech-
nique allows us to track the correla-
tions’ long-term evolution, giving a 
good idea of how U.S. influence has 
changed over time. 
Among a group of EU members—
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the U.K.—the 
correlations show a slow but steady 
decrease in U.S. business cycles’ imme-
diate impact (Chart 2A). The decline is 
more pronounced after the 1981–2001 
window; even then, it’s undeniable 
Chart 2
Impact of Current U.S. Business Cycles Diminishes Overseas
Values closer to 1 indicate strong contemporaneous responses to changes in the U.S. economy;  
lower values suggest weaker links. In recent decades, other nations have become less sensitive to  
U.S. trends.
A. European Union Nations
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Japan. This is most likely due to the 
country’s severe recession throughout 
the 1990s and into the 2000s.
The correlations’ faster decline 
after the 1981–2001 window suggests 
that the effect of current U.S. fluctua-
tions on other economies’ contem-
poraneous performance is gradually 
diminishing. This decline may reflect a 
higher degree of countries’ exposure 
to outside economic forces. 
The 1970s saw the end of 
the Bretton Woods system’s fixed 
exchange rates as well as global events 
like oil shocks and financial crises. 
These developments set the stage for 
a step-up in the pace of globalization 
in the 1980s, with notable increases in 
the international trade of goods and 
services and in cross-border capital 
flows.
Overall, the analysis suggests 
a gradual decrease in the ability of 
current U.S. economic conditions to 
explain other countries’ current fluctua-
tions. If U.S. fluctuations had affected 
other countries only contemporaneous-
ly, the results could have been inter-
preted as a decrease in U.S. impact on 
economies abroad. However, the latest 
episode shows delays in U.S. influ-
ence, suggesting that it may now take 
time for U.S. trends to manifest them-
selves in other countries’ economies. 
A correlation analysis of the 
world’s reaction to the latest U.S. eco-
nomic slowdown would have underes-
timated U.S. influence in the beginning 
of the crisis. To overcome this prob-
lem, we apply a different technique 
that allows past U.S. fluctuations to 
affect current fluctuations in other 
countries.5 We use four quarters to 
capture the possibility that the effects 
may take up to a year to surface. To 
determine how past U.S. business 
cycles have affected other countries 
over the years, we use an 80-quarter 
moving window starting in the fourth 
quarter of 1969, just as we did with 
the correlations.6
Our findings show an overall 
downward drift for both the EU mem-
bers and the other countries, indicating 
a weakening of U.S. cyclical move-
ments’ lead over fluctuations in most 
other countries (Charts 3A, B). The 
statistics above the black line represent 
instances in which some or all of the 
four previous quarterly U.S. cyclical 
movements do affect current cycles in 
other countries with 95 percent prob-
ability. Statistics below the black line 
indicate that all of them do not. 
 The downward drift is especially 
pronounced prior to the 1981–2001 
window, which suggests past U.S. 
fluctuations had rapidly decreasing 
importance for other countries’ current 
activity in the earlier part of the sam-
ple. After 1981–2001, the downward 
Chart 3
Impact of Past U.S. Business Cycles Weakens, Then Stabilizes




















































NOTE: Results are based on Granger causality, which measures whether past U.S. business cycles affect current business 
cycles in other countries.
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drift gets smoother and stabilizes or, in 
some cases, reverses. 
It’s possible that the global inter-
action of demand, potential supplies 
and expectations began to truly open 
national economies to influences from 
abroad in the early 1980s, challenging 
traditional U.S. preeminence. With a 
higher and broader degree of expo-
sure to the rest of the world, countries 
wouldn’t react exclusively nor imme-
diately to U.S. developments. In this 
setting, however, past U.S. fluctuations 
would regain their importance and 
increase their impact on other coun-
tries’ business cycles. This would be 
consistent with previous results that 
show U.S. economic fluctuations affect 
other countries with a delay rather 
than contemporaneously.
Shocks and Their Ripples
Unexpected events—for example, 
the current financial crisis—often send 
ripples through the global economy. 
For a broader perspective, we focus 
on how shocks to current U.S. busi-
ness cycles impact other countries’ 
fluctuations and consider the duration 
of these effects. 
Impulse-response analysis explains 
the initial impact of current U.S. shocks 
on other economies. We look at a  
1 percent U.S. shock and measure the 
percent change in other countries’ cur-
rent cyclical movements. Generally, 
impulse responses take some time 
before they disappear. The cumulative 
response can be derived by adding 
up the effects until they die out. Once 
again, we use 80-quarter windows to 
capture changes over time.
For the seven EU countries, the 
cumulative effects rise, particularly after 
the 1981–2001 window (Chart 4A). 
Other key U.S. trading partners show 
similar patterns (Chart 4B). This sug-
gests that U.S. shocks now have greater 
impact on other economies and, there-
fore, may take longer to dissipate. 
The full effect isn’t seen immediately; 
instead, it shows up over time.
Overall, U.S. influence isn’t neces-
sarily decreasing but taking longer to 
fully appear. That may help explain 
the delayed response of the rest of 
the world to the latest U.S. economic 
slowdown. To understand this timing 
change, we calculate how long it takes 
for the effects of a U.S. shock to disap-
pear in other countries. 
We measure the duration in other 
countries of a 1 percent shock to U.S. 
economic activity by calculating half-
lives, or half the time it takes for an 
impulse response to dissipate. Rolling 
80-quarter windows allow us to catch 
timing changes in impulse responses 
over the years. 
For the EU countries, the half-life 
for a U.S. economic shock increases 
Chart 4
U.S. Shocks Show Greater Cumulative Impact Overseas
A. European Union Nations
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over the years. It takes one to six 
quarters for the first-window estimation 
and six to nine quarters for the last 
window (Chart 5A). The same occurs 
with the four other U.S. trading part-
ners; half-lives range from one to four 
quarters in the first window and five to 
eight quarters in the last (Chart 5B).
The cumulative impact of U.S. 
output shocks grows over time, and 
half-lives reveal longer lags in other 
countries’ responses to those shocks. 
We conclude that spillovers, on aver-
age, are larger and more delayed than 
in previous decades. At the same time, 
we find that spillovers are less predict-
able today. 
Globalization means countries are 
Chart 5
Half-Lives Show U.S. Shocks Felt for Longer Time Abroad 
A. European Union Nations
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SOURCES: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations.
We conclude that spillovers,   
on average, are larger   
and more delayed than in 
previous decades. At the   
same time, we find that   
spillovers are less   
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more exposed than ever to outside 
economic forces and noneconomic 
developments in other nations. A 
shock in any given country has the 
potential of rippling through all the 
nations it interacts with, making the 
shock larger and more delayed. 
In a more integrated economy, the 
increased probability of unexpected 
swings in supply or demand abroad, 
variations in exchange rates and social 
or political disturbances add to global 
uncertainty. In this context, U.S. output 
shocks are likely to have magnified 
downstream consequences. If the U.S. 
has a cumulatively larger and more 
delayed response to its own output 
shocks, these tendencies in other 
countries become less of a mystery.7
We look at the cumulative U.S. 
impact of a 1 percent shock and the 
shock’s half-life. The results point to a 
cumulatively larger but not necessar-
ily more delayed response in the U.S. 
economy (Chart 6). The greater cumu-
lative response within the U.S. may 
partly explain why other countries’ 
responses are also larger. However, 
the relative stability of the half-life 
may indicate that the other econo-
mies’ delayed responses come from 
increased complexity in the avenues of 
transmission of U.S. influence, notably 
the multiplication of international trade 
links and the development of more 
sophisticated financial markets. 
Globalization’s Role 
Our results show that cycli-
cal movements in the U.S. economy 
affect other economies with a lag, 
rather than contemporaneously. This 
is especially true after the early 1980s, 
when a clear acceleration in the pace 
of global integration took place. U.S. 
influence seems to show up gradually 
now, taking longer than it once did 
for the full effects of a shock to the 
U.S. business cycle to manifest in other 
economies. This suggests the U.S. may 
have less short-term impact over other 
economies, but it continues to exert 
strong longer-term influence over busi-
ness cycles worldwide. 
The failure to appreciate these 
changes in the nature and timing of 
U.S. influence led some analysts to the 
theory of decoupling to explain the 
performance of other countries at the 
beginning of the U.S. slowdown in 
2007. In light of our findings, decou-
pling doesn’t describe the current rela-
tionship between the U.S. and foreign 
economies.
Global economic integration 
may have made other countries more 
dependent on each other and weak-
ened their initial responses to U.S. 
economic fluctuations. This could help 
explain the delays seen in the world-
wide response to the U.S. slowdown. 
No longer do other countries 
catch a cold the moment the U.S. 
sneezes. They do catch a cold, but the 
onset is much slower and the effect is 
longer lasting.
Understanding the changing nature 
of the U.S. economy’s influence in the 
world and the global forces behind it 
decreases uncertainty and allows eco-
nomic agents to make more informed 
Chart 6
U.S. Shocks at Home: Stronger but Not Longer
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decisions. If the lags between the 
economic ups and downs in the U.S. 
and the rest of the world are, in fact, 
increasing, other countries can better 
predict business cycles in their own 
economies, central bankers abroad 
can conduct proactive monetary policy 
in response to U.S. slowdowns and 
private businesses can better antici-
pate interest rate swings and demand 
shocks. 
Fernandez is an economist in the Research 
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ 
Houston Branch. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy is an assis-
tant professor at the University of Memphis.
Notes
1 To calculate potential output, we use a relatively 
recent technique called filtering. It involves filter-
ing the data to remove the growth component, 
decomposing gross domestic product (GDP) 
into short-term fluctuations and slowly evolving 
trends. See “Band Spectrum Regression,” by 
Robert F. Engle, International Economic Review, 
vol. 15, no.1, 1974, pp. 1–11; “Postwar U.S. 
Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation,” 
by Robert J. Hodrick and Edward C. Prescott, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 29, 
no. 1, 1997, pp. 1–16; and “Measuring Business 
Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters for 
Economic Time Series,” by Marianne Baxter 
and Robert G. King, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 4, 1999, pp. 575–93. 
Filtering may become very complex, but it can 
be regarded as a two-sided moving average 
of past and future GDP values. For real-time 
research, the two-sided nature poses problems 
for measuring the most recent business cycles 
because current output data points partly depend 
on future GDP values that aren’t available. To 
overcome this problem, we estimate the series 
prior to applying the filter. See “How Accurate 
Are Real-time Estimates of Output Trends and 
Gaps?” by Mark Watson, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond Economic Quarterly, Spring 2007, 
pp. 143–61.
2 Our data come from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics. However, 
good-quality data aren’t available on China and 
Mexico for the time span of this analysis. 
3 Real-time data aren’t available for all the 
countries and the time span of this analysis. 
We reconstruct real-time output gap estimates 
using the pseudo-real-time approach. See “The 
Reliability of Inflation Forecasts Based on Output 
Gap Estimates in Real Time,” by Athanasios 
Orphanides and Simon van Norden, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 37, no. 3, 2005, 
pp. 583–601. To extract the cyclical component, 
we use Watson’s (2007) version of the Baxter 
and King band-pass filter, which fixes the original 
filter’s end-of-sample problem by first extending 
the series 25 years in both directions using an 
autoregressive model in annual growth rates. 
The initial output gap estimate covers the first 40 
data points (from 1960:Q1 to 1969:Q4), and the 
resulting dataset with pseudo-real-time business 
cycles begins in 1969:Q4.
4 Starting in 1969:Q4, the first point of our 
previously estimated real-time business cycles 
dataset, we calculate the correlation between 
the U.S. and the other countries from that point 
to 1989:Q4 (80 quarters later). Then we move 
the window one quarter ahead and calculate the 
correlation from 1970:Q1 to 1990:Q1 and so on 
until the end of the sample, from 1987:Q4 to 
2007:Q4.
5 The technique is called vector autoregressive, 
or VAR.
6 We use the VAR framework to perform Granger 
causality tests and a simple likelihood test with 
which we essentially investigate whether statis-
tics from the last four quarterly U.S. business 
cycles have an effect on the current cycles of 
other countries.
7 The behavior of the unemployment rate sug-
gests that U.S. growth recessions have been 
shallower but longer in the Great Moderation 
period, beginning in the mid-1980s, than they 
were before.